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This working paper reviews the literature in the field of international business that is concerned
with business in the transition economies in Eastern Europe, as well as literature in related fields
that is of pertinent interest to international business scholars. It has been written in preparation of
a chapter for the Oxford Handbook of International Business, edited by Tom Brewer and Alan
Rugman (OUP: 2001). It contains more material than can be included in the final handbook
chapter. 
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4Introduction
Until 1989, the countries of the Soviet bloc traded primarily in autarky from the world economy.
The small volumes of East-West business were conduced on the basis of counter-trade negotiated
with state-trade monopolies (e.g. Neale and Shipley 1990). Only few Western businesses operated
within the region, including Occidental Petroleum and Great Northern Telecom (Jacobsen 1997)
who offered services considered vital by the socialist leadership.
The revolutions of 1989 brought dramatic changes for existing business relationships (e.g.
Salmi and Møller 1994) and opened major business opportunities for the first time since
respectively 1917 in Russia and 1945 in Central Europe. The region from Prague to Vladivostok
embarked on reform from similar starting positions and with comparable objectives, yet with
increasingly divers development since. Th  transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe1
(CEE) become similar to other mediu -income market economies, while most successor states of
the Soviet Union are lagging especially in building market-oriented institutions.
The international policy framework evolved very favourably for international business,
with rapid reduction of trade barriers and liberalization of foreign investment regulation.
Membership in international organizations, such as WTO, facilitated this process. The westernmost
countries signed <Europe Agreements’ with the European Union that further reduced trade barriers
vis-a-vis the union, and becane stepping stones towards eventual membership in the union [e.g.
Lavigne 1998].
Western businesses were quick to position themselves in the new markets, as is illustrated
by the acceleration of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region, see Figure 1, and the dramatic2
reorientation in the pattern of international trade (EBRD 1999). However, businesses operating in
the region face a distinct institutional environment, which pre-determines the strategic opportunities
for businesses (Peng 2000, Hoskisson et al. 2000). This creates challenges for managers of both
local firms and Western business partners that differ not only f om Western experience, but also
among transition economies. On the other hand, outward internation l business from the region has
been slow to evolve, and rarely been studied (but see Svetlii et al. 1999). However, the
comparison with China or Latin America (Child 2001, Grosse 2001) suggests that it will be of
increasing importance in the near future.
International business research has so far focused on Western multinational fir s operating
in the region. Research have approached the transition economies in different ways:
C by testing the validity of general theories in the specific context of transition, and
C by exploring and explaining the specific features of the business context and their implications
for business operating in the region.
Figure 1: FDI in selected transition economies
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The former is prominent in leading management journals, and offers insights for those pursuing
development and refinement of theory in their respective fields. The latter research is generally
more exploratory and generates novel insights on the functioning of business in transitio
economies, and theoretical frameworks to analyse it. It contributes to our understanding of the
interaction between firms and their environment, which in turn can stimulate research on th
relationships between firm behaviour and institutions in mature market economies. This review
focuses on challenges faced by businesses in the transition context drawing upon research beyond
mainstream business journals.
This review is structured as follows: section two summarises the microeconomic aspects
of economic transition, taking the development of new institutions as starting point as they set the
stage for developments in the enterprise sphere. The third section discusses multinational firms
entering the region, considering their motives, and their strategies to deal with the specific context.
Section four addresses some managerial challenges that arise for multinational firms operating in
the region. Section five concludes with perspectives for future research.
Note: net inflows recorded in the balance of payments, source: EBRD 1999, table 3.1.6.
62. Transition
2.1 New Institutions: What Kind of Capitalism?
The essence of economic transition “from plan to market” (World Bank 1996) is the replacement
of one set of institutions governing economic activity by a different one. Institutions, albeit
frequently neglected in economic theorising, have an essential role in setting the ’rules of the game’
by which individuals interact in a market economy (North 1990). They ensure the competitiveness
of markets, for instance by preventing or regulating monopolies, insider trading and negative
externalities. Only with a solid framework set by institutions does he free interaction of agents lead
to efficient allocation of goods and services. 
The Western market economies have built their institutions over decades, if not centuries,
and they vary as a result of both different historical evolution andunderlying cultures (North 1981).
The institutions are supported by strong and impartial states, e.g. as guarantors of law enforcement
and an independent judiciary. The path dependency of institutional frameworks let to a variety of
‘business systems’ that differ not only between the US, Asia and Europe but even within Western
Europe (Whitley, ed. 1992).
Eastern Europe is building its institutions under strong outside influence, especially from
the Anglo-Saxon sphere. Yet, new institutions cannot be superimposed from above as they must
meet not only an efficiency test, but also be socially acceptable (Offe 1995). The distinct cultural
and systemic inheritance influences especially informal institutions such as norm and values. I
addition, the political development during the early years of transition influenced the way new
institutions have been set up, notably the methods of privatisation (Stark 1992, Hare et al. 1999).
Policy choices made during the period of radical change around 1990 created institutions and
established distribution of power. In many countries, the weak legal framework permitted a large
extent of opportunistic behaviour, rent shifting, bribery and corruption (e.g. Nelson et al. 1998).
In some countries, vested interests have been created that would not benefit from further reform
(Stiglitz 1999, EBRD 1999). Due to path de endency of institutions, policies during that ‘window
of opportunity’ and the inheritance from the previous regime shape the future institutional
frameworks (North 1990, Stark 1992). Consequently, we can predict that Eastern Europe may
develop a distinctive form of capitalism.
In the 1990's, the institutional frameworks were unstable and rapidly changing. The
fundamental change in the environment may prompt an expectation of equally radical change of
behaviour, but this did not happen in many CEE organisations (Whitley and Csaban 1998a). Even
where formal institutions were established quickly, e.g. by copying laws from elsewhere, informal
institutions are slow to evolve. Consequently, the process of building institutions in transition
economies takes more time than most reform scenarios envisaged in 1990 (Murrell 1992, Kogut
71996). During this process, agents face the additional challenge that they cannot base their
decisions on present institutions, which are unstable, and possibly inconsistent. Flexibility and short-
term objectives should thus be the norm.
The distinctiveness of the CEE business systems, be it temporary or permanent, limits the
transferability of Western business strategies and organisational concepts. Hence, strategies
observed in transition economies differ from those in developed economies (P ng and Heath 1996),
and strategies applied successfully in one country may fail in another. Corporate strategies in the
transition economies can thus be explained only by incorporating the specific institutional context
in the analysis. This hold for China (Peng 2000, Child 2001) as well as for Hungary or Russia.
Some generalizations across these countries may be helpful, yet one has to be cautious as the
variation among transition economies may be just as large as that between transition and mature
market economies. The following sections review the evolution of the enterprise sector in this
context, starting with the central institution of the market economy - the market.
2.2. From Plan to Market: Change of Co-ordination Mechanisms
During socialism, the central plan was the core institution co-ordinating economic activity. The
societies thus had strong vertical co-ordination, but failed, among other, because horizontal
linkages between firms were weak (Vlachoutsicos 1998) leading to high transaction costs between
enterprises within supply chains (e.g. Chikan 1996). In addition, the plan focussed on quantitative
output targets with few incentives for quality and customer service.
The main purpose of transition was to introduce markets as ore efficient co-ordination
mechanisms. Yet, the old economic system disintegrated before the instituti ns supporting a market
economy were in place. The absence of, among other, systems providing information, accounting
and auditing as well legal enforcement of contracts all wed extensive information asymmetries and
opportunities for opportunistic behaviour, thus increasing transaction costs (Swaan 1997). The
politically motivated push towards creating markets before creating institutions (Hare et al. 1999)
has been especially drastic in the areas of capit l markets. Mass privatization quickly brought firms
on the stock exchanges, notably in the Czech Republic. Yet as institutions were not in place, this
led to multiple opportunities for abuse by insiders, and in fact very slow restructuring of enterprises
(Spicer et al. 2000).
In particular, the lack of informal institutions such as routines, knowledge and procedures
at the individual and organizational level provoked market failure. Essentially, administrators had
to act as independent economic agents from the day the c ntral plan was dissolved. They had to
act on markets that did not yet exist; they lacked the (often tacit) knowledge on how to use the
market mechanism, and who potential partners and competitors are.Without experience, they had 
to identify potential types of business and preferences of customers; and they had to assess th
8composition of demand and supply, and estimate demand elasticity. Thus, agents engaged in
considerable search processes to set up transactions and to find the right prices (Swaan 1997).
The lack of institutions increases transaction costs, especially for new business relationships,
and thus inhibits many potential transactions, in particular those of complex or long-term nature.
The resulting co-ordination failure has been a major cause of the deep recession of the early 1990's
(Blanchard and Kremer 1996, Swaan 1997). The most visible c nsequence of failing markets is the
widespread use of barter in several successor states of the former Soviet Union (Gaddy and Ickes
1998, Commander and Momsen 1999, Seabright 2000). Yet it also affects international businesses
with the transition economies. Western MNEs lack information on their partners; have to negotiate
with persons inexperienced in business negotiations (Antal-Mokos 1998); and confront unclear
regulatory frameworks, inexperienced bureaucracy (Thornton and Mikheeva 1996) and the weak
enforcement of property rights.
The weaknesses of market instituions, and constraints on internalizing transactions, led to
the widespread use of alternative, intermediate mechanisms of ex ge through informal networks
in CEE (Stark 1996, Clark and Soulsby 1995, Todeva 2000), and even more in Russia (Puffer et
al. 1996, Holden et al. 1998, Salmi 1996, 1999). The post-socialist economies inherited systems
of personal networks that served to overcome shortage under the central plan. These networks
connected firms to authorities, especially the communist party and the plan ministries, and focussed
on influencing plan targets and delivery of crucial inputs. 
The central plan regime created large interdependent production units. They were split into
separate enterprises, but retained a high degree of asset specificity and resource dependencies.
Many firms reacted by recreating inter-firm relationship by informal means  to establish industrial
groups (Stark 1996, Hayri and McDermott 1998). In Hungary, Stark (1996) observed
‘recombinant networks’ of firms with interlocking ownership and other formal and informal
arrangement between related companies. In Russia financial-industrial groups developed close ties
with banks and political institutions and became significant power bases. Where conventional
strategies of internal or external growth are inhibited because the markets for relevant resources
are defunct, ‘network-based growth strategies’ offer an alternative (Peng and Heath 1996).
Businesses react to imperfect markets by network-based co-ordination.
Informal networks have retained their importance as a co-ordination mechanism, due to
structural nd cultural characteristics. However, they do not necessarily reflect the needs of a
market economy. Many focus on extraction of rents from the state through collusion between
businesses, and between business and units (or individuals) of the government, in particular
municipal authorities. The close personal relationships of individuals in different positions
frequently give rise to business practices that violate Western standards of business ethics (Puffer
and McCarthy 1995, Ledeneva 1999). 
9In a market economy, networks also serve an important role in relating interdependent
business and overcoming various market imperfections (Axelson and Easton 1992, Mattson 1993).
Yet clear legal and ethical codes prevent transactions that cause harm to hird parties. Restructuring
the networks to serve the needs of a market economy is thus an essential component of
transformation.
2.3. Privatisation and Corporate Governance
Enterprises in socialist countries had been set-up to achieve the objectives defined by socialist
ideology and the central plan, notably the fulfilment of quantitative plan targets. The transition
places enterprises at a different place in society, redefining the purpose of their existence. This
change involved a formal, legal change and an informal, internal transformation. This section
reviews the changes in formal structures through privatisation and systems of corporat
governance, and the next section discusses the organisational transformation.
Privatisation in transition differs from Western experiences by the scope of the task, th
absence of efficient capital markets, and the lack of private domestic savings that could be invested.
These obstacles were overcome by novel routes of privatisation, most notably mass privatisation
based on voucher schemes. More conventional modes included direct sales to outside investors,
management-employee-buy-outs, and restitution to former owners (Brada 1996, World Bank 1996,
Bornstein 1997).
Privatisation is, however, not a sufficient condition to trigger eterprise estructuring. Many
privatisations other than by sales to outside investors failed to create powerful incentives that
would guide managers in transforming firms. Therefore corporate governance has become the most
debated issue in the transition economics literature (e.g. Frydman et al. 1997, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer 1999, Estrin and Wright 1999). The collapse of communism left state-owned
firms without mechanisms for the state to enforce control, and weak internal structures to handle
the new demands of the marketplace. 
Frequently, managers and/or worker councils attained considerable influence, de facto r
de jure, especially in Poland and many CIS countries. In many cases, insiders managed to convert
their de facto control into formal ownership by opting for privatisation modes that gave them
preferential access to shares.  As a result, many firms, particularly in Poland and the former Soviet
Union, have managers and employees as minority or even majority shareholders (e.g. Åslund 1995,
Blasi et al. 1995). Therefore, theories considering stakeholders, rather than solely shareholders,
have been revived to analyse corporate governance in transition economies (Buck, Filatochev and
Wright 1998, Berglöf and von Thadden 1999, Mygind 1999).
Corporate governance problems also arose as a result of voucher privatisation. Most
transition countries (with the notable exception of Hungary), have implemented a voucher scheme
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as a main pillar of their mass privatisation (e.g. World Bank 1996, Estrin and Stone 1996). It
permitted the creation of widespread popular ownership of industrial equity and the redistribution
of the wealth to citizens in a ‘fair’ way, thus generating popular support for reform. The Czech
scheme - the first and most publicised -  privatised a major share of the country’s assets in several
waves of multiple-auction bidding processes. Investment funds attained considerable power
through the accumulation of vouchers and bidding on behalf of individuals (Coffee 1996). They
now control major Czech businesses, but themselves are often owned by (largely state owned)
banks. This creates interdependent institutions without clear monitoring and control structures, but
with multiple agents that have hold-up power (Hayri and McDermott 1998). The resultant lack of
effective corporate governance has frequently been blamed for the slow progress of enterprise
restructuring (e.g. Nellis 1999).
In Poland, the large privatisation was delayed due to political conflicts over its conditions.
In 1996, shares of some 500 enterprises were allocated to government-sponsored investment funds,
which in turn were privatised through vouchers that are now traded on the Warsaw stock
exchange. Each enterprise was initially owned by a fund holding 33% of equity, plus minority
shareholdings by the other funds, workers, and the government. While overcoming defaults of
corporate governance in the Czech voucher privatisation, the Polish scheme still suffers from
conflicts between different control institutions. In Russia, mass privatisation has been rapid and
created a substantial private sector - but dominated by insider ownership (e.g. Boyko et al. 1995,
Blasi et al. 1997, Earle and Estrin 1997, Wright et al. 1998, Estrin and Wright 1999).  The
resulting management and employee ownership may have positive effects on motivation and labour
productivity (Ben-Ner and Jones 1995), but can be a major obstacle for estructuring in large firms,
if lay-offs or access to outside finance are required.3
Following privatisation, the emergence of lo al equity markets is crucial. The need to raise
fresh capital should induce insider-controlled firms to accept new outsider equity stakes and
provide acquisition opportunities. However, progress has been slow (Earle and Estrin 1996,
Filatochev et al. 1996) and ownership patterns are relatively stable (Jones and Mygind 1999a,
Anderson et al. 1999). Especially in the former Soviet Union, it is difficult to obtain ownership and
effective control of privatised firms, among other because stock market institutions such a
protection of minority shareholders are not in place.
However, competition is at least as important as privatization for enterprises to improve
their efficiency - a result fully consistent with empirical research on privatization in the West (e.g.
Vickers and Yarrow 1991). Yet while many major Western privatisations are indus rie with natural
monopolies that require complex regulation to create competition, most firms privatized in Eastern
Europe enjoy monopoly powers courtesy of past or present governm policy. After privatization,
the key difference is “not how competition affects firm performance, but in the degree to which
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market forces in transition are either softened or distorted” (Bevan et al. 1999:14). Firms in
transition frequently face soft budget constraints and obtain protected market positions of various
sorts. In Russia, a particular problem appears to be the lack of domestic entry, and thus contestable
markets, inpart due to protective intervention by regional authorities (Broadman 1999). In other
countries, such as Poland, new entrants are a major source of competition (see Section 2.5). 
Thus the transition economies are poised to retain corpo a e governance systems that differ
from those in mature market economies, even taking into account the variation found for instance
between the US and Continental Europe. Some of the largest firms in the region are subject to
weak governance while enjoying close contacts to government and, in some ex-Soviet Union states,
considerable barriers to entry. Ye  other firms have gone very far in shedding these legacies of the
20  century. This diversity of governance mechanisms and of competition patterns is likely to beth
a continuing feature of the region for years to come.
2.4. Organisational Transformation
In the socialist regime, firms’ overriding objective was plan-fulfilment. The incentives created by4
central planning led however to severe distortions, such as the production of large volumes of
standardised low quality products, lack of concern for consumer demand, disregard for externalities
of any kind, notably for the environment. By establishing positions rather than creating jobs, firms
employed far more people than necessary to achieve their output target as labour costs were not
a constraining variable.  Employment relationships were effectively based on life-time employment
and enterprises provided many of the social needs of both current and retired employees. The
enterprise sector was reasonably efficient in allocative efficiency, but failed dramatically in
innovation (Berliner 1976, Murrel 1990, Kogut and Zander 2000). In this system, management had
few incentives, or in fact opportunities, to act as business leader or entrepreneur in a Western
sense.
As this brief characterisation makes clear, firms have a very different role in socialist and
in capitalist societies (Heidenreich 1993). Consequently they have different resource configurations,
skill and capability reservoirs, and ways of organising themselves. As transformation involves all
these areas - and I do not content this would be a complete list - it is a complex task.
It typically started with defensive adjustments aimed at survival under hard budget
constraints, e.g. laying off workers r shifting the product mix (see reviews by Brada 1996, Carlin
2000, Bevan et al. 1999 and EBRD 1999). Productivity improved, even before privatisation, as
management reacted to external pressures. However, further strategic and organisational
restructuring is necessary to attain sustainable competitiveness (Meyer 1998b). Few domestic-
owned firms have been able to pursue corporate strategies that would lead to a viable position in
the international competition (Brada 1996, Wright et al. 1998, Stiglitz 1999). Foreign-owned firms
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engaged in more strategic change such as development of new products, investment in new
production facilities, entry into new markets and establishing marketing, new brand names and
distribution channels (e.g. Carlin et al. 1995, Estrin et al. 1997, Newman and Nollen 1998,
Djankov 1999a, Hooley et al. 1996).
At the onset of transition, many advisors focussed on productivity improvements,
promoting redundant assets and downsizing to reduce over-employment. However, excessive
reliance on cost cutting has been criticised for undermining firms’ ability to develop new strategies.
A certain degree of slack can be an important resource for innovation (Nohria and Gulati 1996),
for managerial learning (Geppert 1996) and thus for transformation. Many firms undoubtedly had
excess slack. However, some firms, notably in East Germany, seem to have cut the workforce to
such extent that the moral was undermined, and no slack left that could become a source for new
growth (Thomson and Millar 1999).
Beyond downsizing, the re-configuration of resources needs a pro-active approach to
acquiring complementary resources, through both investment in complementary assets and
organisational learning (Uhlenbruck and Meyer 2000). Especially in the area of marketing, firms
have to improve their basic competences in terms of structure, systems and processes,
organizational culture and human resources (Batra 1997). The learning begins with top managers,
who are often not well prepared to lead the transformation process. Many essential management
capabilities were not developed under socialism because other skills were asked for. Managerial
learning (see Section 4.2) and employee training thus are crucial elements of the resource
upgrading.
These organizational changes ris  not only from the change of economic system, but also
from the methods of organising production. The labour process in the s ialist period was designed
on Taylorist principles, with high degrees of division of labour and technical job specialisation, and
close supervision. Yet, the frequency of distortions in supplies, inadequate machinery and to some
extent shortage of skilled labour made the full realisation of the cost advantages impossible. As
Taylorism has been the norm of industrial production in the 1950s, but passed into history in most
sectors in industrial countries, it was expected that transition would instigate the shift to post-
Taylorist production (Sorge 1993, Meyer and Møller 1998). Yet evidence from Hu gary shows
that in some firms, notably locally owned ones, the opposite occurred. Firms refined their ‘scientific
management’ and reduced costs by more precise division between skilled and un ill  workers
and more rigorous supervisory control. In the short-term, these firms showed above average
productivty and profitability (Whitley and Csaban 1998b, Taplin and Frege 1999). Yet it is
doubtful if such a strategy will enhance competitiveness in the longer term.
Also in other empirical evidence points to continuity rather than radical change. Observing
27 Hungarian case firms, Whitley and Csaban (1998a) conclude that by most criteria, they showed
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a remarkable degree of continuity, for instance in terms of product ix, production technology, and
markets. Although top management had often been replaced, the new leaders were typically
promoted internally. Interdependence led firms to continue existing relationships rather than to seek
business opportunities with different partners (Stark 1996, Todeva 2000). The continuity of
personnel, the persisting importance of the political environment a d limited role of product market
competition contributed to continuity in management strategies and behaviour (Martin 1999,
Newman and Nollen 1998).
This continuity is natur l, according to the evolutionary view of transformation. Resource
re-configuration requires the acquisition of new capabilities, which have to be developed from
existing ones, in combination with imported know-how. Organizations thus evolve, rather than
reincarnate themselves overnight, when facing change - even radical change - in their environment.
Consequently, Spicer, McDermott and Kogut (2000) are concerned that privatization was too
radical and broke up existing industry networks and thus inhibited the effective use of co-
specialised resources. Kogut (1996) recommends that firms ought to learn through experimentation
and internal development of new routines and capabilities adapted to the specific context, rather
than the wholesale imposition of imported routines. Lieb-Dóczy and Meyer (2000) suggest that
especially foreign acquirers risk losing valuable local capabilities if they concentrate on transfer of
their established best practice and neglect development of variety by fostering indigenous
capabilities.
In conclusion, ET and the ensuing managerial challenges are complex phenomena that
cannot be analyzed satisfactorily with establish d theoretical frameworks only. Having reached the
limits of conventional economic analysis, further analysis may extend the resource-based view of
the firm to explore specific challenges of emerging and transition economies (Hoskisson et al.
2000). I see potential in complementing this perspective with organizational learning theory
(Uhlenbruck and Meyer 2000), evolutionary theory (Lieb-Doczy and Meyer 2000) or theory of
coordination games (Meyer 2000c) to analyze the changing resource base during ET.
2.5. The Growth of Entrepreneurial Start-ups 
Despite the major efforts in privatisation, much of the recent economic growth in the transition
economies comes from newly established firms. Especially in Poland, the new private sector is
flourishing while much of the former state-sector is stagnating (e.g. Johnson and Loveman 1995,
EBRD 1999). These new firms are often the most dynamic units in the region. Some new private
firms arose from the liquidation of state-owned firms, as individuals or groups of managers or
workers acquired the assets. Other start-ups grew out of the informal grey economy. Peng (2000)
points to four groups of individuals that become entrepreneurs by setting up their own businesses
in transition economies:
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C Scientist and other professionals pursue entrepreneurial activity in reaction to the rapid
decline in real income at their job in the public sector or a privatizing firm. Often this starts
as part-time job, notably for academics seeking to better their income through consultancy
(Webster and Charap 1993, Kirby et al. 1996).
C Former cadres frequently become ntrepreneurs especially in Russia, capitalizing on their
control over key resources, including physical and financial assets, and most importantly
network connections to the bureaucracy (Rona-Tas 1994, Parish and Michelson 1996).
C Individuals who were left at the bottom of society after losing their previous position may
survive as street trader, and gradually upgrade to bazaar trader, and to shop owner-
managers. They thus mature from the grey economy to the official economy. 
C Farmers may have enjoyed privateownership of their plots, as in Poland, which provided
them with initial resources for entrepreneurial activity in related sectors.
The pressure of enterprise transformation created strong push factors for specialists to leave the
uncertainty of a privatizing firm, and seek their own fortune. Many, however, retain close business
relationships with their former e ployer, more than spin-offs in the West typically do (Kirby et al.
1996). Entrepreneurial firms thus grow a  part of the new corporate networks in the region (Stark
1996). They are joined by managers who attained control, with our without formal ownership, over
privatized enterprises.
The newly established businesses benefit, compared to privatized ones, from simple
governance structures, low fixed costs, and flexibility to switch from unpromising markets to more
attractive ones (Johnson and Loveman 1995, Puffer et al. 2000). Moreover, without the burden of
inheritance from a predecessor organization, entrepre eurs have the freedom to hire selectively the
most suitable employees. In the early years of liberalisation, many newly established firms were
extremely profitable, in part because they offered products not reviou ly available, or served niche
markets, and second-movers were slow.
However, the opportunities for entrepreneurs are often constrained by their lack of
resources and by the institutional context. Financial resources have been a major constraint for
many given the underdeveloped capital markets (Holmström 1996, Johnson and Loveman 1995).
Venture capital funds have only recently been established in the region and ar  gradually developing
expertise in assessment and monitoring of entrepreneurial firms in the transition context (Karsai et
al. 1997). Yet equally important are human capital as well as political and social capital, i.e. access
to key decision-makers in politics and business (Batjargal 2000).
Institutional change permitting the establishment of new businesses and simplifying
licensing procedures was the starting call for entrepreneurship. Yet obstacles in the institutional
framework are still the main hindrance for further development of entrepreneurial firms, especially
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in the less advanced transition economies. This includes high informal barriers to entry, weak
protection of property rights, excessive bureaucracy, and corruption. For instance, newly
established firms pay on average over 5% in ‘bribe tax’ compared to around 4% for privatised and
state-owned firms (EBRD 1999). Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (1999) fo nd that reinvestment
of profits has been especially constrained by the weak protection of property rights. Moreover,
entrepreneurs continue to be obstructed by a weak investment climate and indirect barriers to entry
(EBRD 1999, Broadman 1999).
Entrepreneurship research on transition economies stands - unless major contributions
have escaped my attention - very much at the beginning. However, it ought to be as important as5
the transformation of existing SOE for the future of these economies, as well as for Western
businesses looking for suitable partners in the region.
3. Strategies of Multinational Businesses
3.1. Motivations
Theoretical research has pointed to the importance of factor cost advantages (e.g. Ozawa 1992),
as has a comparison of CEE with East Asia (Urban 1992, UN 1995, Meyer 2000b). FDI was
expected to utilise factor differences and to build export oriented production. CEE still has low
labour costs compared with Western Europe although higher than some locations in Southeast
Asia. Factor cost advantages may also arise from low cost of locally extracted raw materials.
However, there is almost undisp ted evidence that markets are the main attraction of the
region, as reported in the large number of surveys conducted among Western firms with
investments in CEE and among joint-ventures within the region (e.g. Meyer 1998a, Pye 1998,
OECD 1995, Lankes and Venebles 1996). Many MNEs considering entry expect considerabl
long-term growth of demand, especially as the income of the middle class, their prime customers,
grows faster than the average measured by GDP (Batra 1997). Several features make the markets
in CEE particularly attractive (Estrin and Meyer 1998):
First, consumers in CEE had previously had little or no access to consumer goods and
brands available in other countries at similar levels of per capita income. Trade liberalisation
unleashed a catch-up demand, especially for consumer durables for which West European markets
are saturated. The high status of Western good was in part a result of Western media penetration,
even before 1989. It was sustained through effective advertising and brand-building in the newly
liberalised local media. 
Second, entry in CEE may be a strategic move by MNEs to sustain or enhance their global
strategic position. Global leaders may invest to prevent challenges from their rivals or the
emergence of new competitors from within the region. Firms dominated by a larger competitor may
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see early entry in new markets as an opportunity to gain competitive advantages. MNEs established
in both Western and Eastern Europe may have superior opportunities to exploit price
discrimination, product differentiation or vertical integration. In industries with major network
externalities, such as consultancy and financial services, presence in the region may be necessary
to offer global coverage for their globally operating customers.
Third, several underdeveloped sectors of industry are being reestablished to accelerate
productivity growth across the economy. Governments in CEE are therefore inviting foreign
investors to upgrade t lecommunications, power-generation and distribution, and transportation
infrastructure. They encourage selective private entry, e.g. licensing of n w service providers or
concessions to operate existing public infrastructure (EBRD 1996). In addition, the privatization
of utilities, especially in the telecommunications sector, attracts substantial FDI capital inflows,
which explains some of the volatility of FDI flow data (Figure 1). The infrastructure development
creates furthermore opportunities for those providing inputs, such as construction firms, turnkey-
plant engineers, and manufacturers of telecommunications equipment.
Factor cost oriented FDI has picked up since the early 1990s. While fewer in number, this
includes some high profile FDI projects and substantial capital inflows. Many projects may initially
have focussed on local markets, but as these were saturated and productivity in the new affiliate
increased they started exporting to other nodes in the investors’ multinational network.
CEE has comparative advantages in intermediate technical skills as the level of technical
education i  the region was relatively high, although it has considerably deteriorated since 1990,
at least in Russia (Clarke and Metalina 2000). At the same time, unit labour costs have risen
substantially but are still significantly below West European, especially German, levels. Economic
policy has strengthened this advantage in some countries through an effective undervaluation of
exchange rates or incomes policy, such as constraints on wage increases.  FDI can utilize the lower
costs by combining it with Western capital and managerial skills.
Low factor costs attract especially SME and firms from the neighbouring countries who
exploit he cost differential through outward-processing with or without equity investment. The
relocation of production has been important is a small number of industries including textiles,
clothing, furniture or musical instruments. It gained in relative importance in the mid 1990's as cost-
seeking investors were under less time-pressure than market-seekers.
However, many cost-oriented investors were deterred by low productivity, lack of
telecommunication and transportation infrastructure, and bureaucracy (OECD 1995, Meyer 1998a,
Pye 1998). In addition, investors face obstacles in identifying suitable local partners and suppliers
able to provide inputs and services at the required level of quality.
3.2. Entry Strategies
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Since most Western businesses entered the region only in the 1990s, CEE provides an excellent
laboratory to study international business entry. Entry strategies encompass a number of
interrelated strategic variables, however, researchers have preferred to analyse the different
components separately, and so will this review. Firstly, there are locational choices, which have
been discussed in the previous section. Secondly, entrants select an entry mode, such as export,
contractual co-operation or FDI. Direct investors furthermore have to decide the share of their
equity ownership, and whether to invest in a greenfield project or by acquiring an existing firm.
Third, the timing and speed of entry is crucial for instance for those pursuing first-mover
advantages. Moreover, a successful entry requires an appropriate strategy for marketing, e.g.
branding of products, and for human resource management.
3.2.1. Entry Mode Strategies
The choice of entry mode soon became a foremost research topic of IB scholars interested in
Eastern Europe (e.g. Brouthers et al. 1998, Meyer 1997, 1998a, Ali and Mirza 1996, Pye 1998).
Initially, entrants preferred modes with low exposure to country risk, especially exports and
contracting. Ten years into the transition, this still applied in some countries of the former Soviet
Union, but less in Central Europe. Most businesses started with exporting, but accelerated
relatively quickly to contractual and investment modes. Many firms moved quickly along the
internationalization process, some even establishing FDI in their firstly activity (Engelhard and
Eckert 1993, Ali and Mirza 1996, Czinkota et al. 1997).
Contractual modes were particular important before legal constraints had been fully
removed, and when investment risks were perceived to be high. Beyond the standard forms, this
included for instance management-, technology- and turnkey-contracts. Franchising became
popular as eager local entrepreneurs looked to franchisers to prov d  them with both resources and
managerial training. At the same time, those managing global brands found franchising a fast way
of expansion while limiting their investment risk. Subcontracting has been particularly popular with
German and Italian SMEs relocating selected stages of their production process (Naujoks and
Schmidt 1994, Pellegrin 1998). New contractual arrangements have been developed to facilitate
the region’s infra-structure investments. For instance, build-operate-transfer contracts permit
private investment and ownership, yet with ultimate transfer to the public sector.
Ownership of FDI
In the early 1990s, a JV was the only legally permissible mode to establish a direct investment
(OECD 1995, Hood and Young 1994, Hunya 1996). Yet, the ownership patterns ave been rapidly
changing since then. Regulations have been relaxed in many small steps, and by 1992, FDI was
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fairly unregulated in most countries (EBRD 1994), though it took far longer in Russia (McMillan
1994).
This explains the initially high share of joint-ventures, and the massive shift towards fully-
owned affiliates in the mid 1990's as both new investors and by old investors increasing their equity
share (Sharma 1995). Many acquisitions in the privatization process occurred in a staggered
pattern, and were thus registered as JV although from the beginning the investor attained
management control and envisaged the acquisition of full ownership (Per tti and Gulati 1993, Lieb-
Dóczy and Meyer 2000). These ‘transitory alliances’ (Hagedorn and Sadowski 1999) are means
of implementing acquisitions in a particular institutional context, and share little of the
characteristics typically observed in joint-ventures (cf. Beamish and Killing 1997). As temporary
arrangement they offer advantages to both partners. Governments obtain some control over the
firm’s restructuring, and thus externalities created for the local economy, while capitalising on the
probable appreciation of the share value as the transition economy becomes less uncertain (and
avoid embarrassment over initial underpricing). Governments may also be reluctant to transfer
control over firms deemed strategic, or trad ng with governmental institutions (Wright et al. 1993)
for both political and economic reasons. The investor obtains access to local institutions and
networks while sharing investment risk.
Investors normally aim for full control of acquired businesses, not only to reduce
transaction costs but to be able to enforce faster turnaround of former state-owned enterprises
(Aulakh and Kotabe 1997). However, many entrants, at least initially, accept lower degrees of
involvement. A local partner may be useful in many ways, notably in accessing local business and
government etworks. Especially in Russia, such informal networks are vital for business,
substituting many functions of the ins itutional framework in mature market economies (Thornton
and Mikheeva 1996, Puffer et al. 1996, Holden et al. 1998). Consequently, entry modes with higher
capital commitment are preferred in the advanced transition economies, while low risk modes are
employed in markets that are still unstable or lacking a reputable institutional framework.
Formal tests of the determinants of entry modes mostly find support for the same factors
as studies elsewhere, especially with respect to firm and industry specific variables, thus confirming
the validity of the respective theoretical framework. For instance, Brouthers et al. (1998) showed
the influence of cultural attributes of both home and host country, in addition to cultural distance.
CEE-specific aspects emerge with the factor endowment of the local economy and the institutional
framework, which influence the transaction costs in pertinent markets and thus investors’
internalization preferences (Meyer 1998a).
The performance of FDI has been analyzed on the basis of survey data, e.g. in Hungary
(Lyles and Baird 1994, Meschi 1997), Russia (Fey 1995, Thornton and Mikheeva 1996) and
Kazakhstan (Charman 1998). The success of a JV depends mainly on issues such as the
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compatibility of the objectives of the parents, and establishment of mutual trust while avoiding of
dominant control by either partner. International business experience of the local partner is
important, as is the Western partner’s management training. In Russia, reputation effects and self-
enforcing contracts are important to overcome the weaknesses of the institutional framework
(Thornton and Mikheeva 1996). However, wholly owned operations are judged to perform better
in investors’ own assessment (e.g. Lyles and Baird 1994).
Acquisition or Greenfield
Foreign investors wishing to establish a wholly-owned operation could often do so only through
an acquisition in the privatisation process. This, however, requires complex negotiations with
multiple governmental authorities (Brouthers and Bamossy 1997, Antal-Mokos 1998, Marinova
2000) as well as with management and work councils (Bak and Kulawczuk 1997). Moreover, the
investor has to take responsibility for enterprise transformation (cf. Section 3), and may face
considerable post-acquisition investment in resource upgrading and organisational change while
being constraint by stipulations of the privatization contract (see Section 4.1). 
As this post-acquisition investment often exceeds the initial investment, the project takes
on features normally associated with greenfield inv stment, and clearly different from conventional
acquisitions. Such ‘brownfield’ investment (Meyer and Estrin 1999) can substitute for both
greenfield strategies where crucial local assets are not available in unbundled form, and for
acquisition strategies where the resources of local firms are to weak to face international
competition.
Investors prepared to commit to enterprise restructuring and technological upgrading, find
acquisitions attractive to access valuable human capital in local firms, especially their technological
skills, and to (informal) local networks and to government agencies. Local brand names and
distribution networks are also valuable assets in some consumer goods industries. Acquirers
furthermore report fewer bureaucratic obstacles to acquiring land and obtaining the permits
required to start or expand production (Meyer and Estrin 1999).
Despite these advantages, investors increasingly bypass the restructuring of local firms and
set up greenfield operations. This allows them to implement their corpora e strategy without having
to incorporate the heritage of an acquired firm. Small firms that lack the managerial and financial
resources to lead enterpris  restructuring, are even more avoiding acquisitions in the privatization
process (Estrin and Meyer 1998). Consequently, the share of greenfield investment is increasing
in CEE, in contrast to world-wide trends.
3.2.2. Strategies for Timing and Acceleration of Entry
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Many MNEs in industries with world-wide oligopolistic structures were among the first entrants
(Marton 1993, Kogut 1996). They pursued first-mover advantages that are perceived to b very
important in consumer goods industries where brand names are crucial competitive assets (e.g.
Arnold and Quelch 1998). Expected long-term benefits include brand recognition, control of
distribution channels, and preferential access to local suppliers and governments. One way to attain
such advantages is to acquire the dominant local firm in the industry. Moreover, early entrants may
even be able to influence the local regulatory environment in their favour. The perceived
importance of first-mover advantages is highlighted by Lankes and Venebles (1996) who report
a bimodal distribution on the first-mover motive: very important for 39% of investors, especially
for those targeting the local market, but unimportant for most others.
Is this euphoria about first-mover advantages justified? Liebermann and Montgomery
(1998) cast doubt on the first-mover argument by showing that product innovators rarely became
market leaders. An optimal product specification and a marketing strategy to penetrate a mass
market are more important for lasting success. The entry in Eastern Europe poses slightly different
challenges as the products in question are at mature stages of their life cycle and their marketing
methods have been tested elsewhere. Even so, first entrants have to overcome obstacles in the local
environment, and strategic decisions on e.g. location and partner choice incur considerable sunk
costs. Moreover, brand names may be worth less where brand loyalty is low as consumers still
experiment with new products. Case evidence suggests that some first-movers failed to realize their
expected benefits, and second-movers could build a larger market-share or a more profitable
operation (Meyer and Estrin 1998, Bridgewater et al. 1995). 
Later entrants benefit from local bureaucrats’ improved understanding of the needs of
business, and from first-movers’ investment in training and introduction of new types of products
to ‘build the market’. ‘Fast-seconds’ can learn from successes and failures of the first-mover and
adapt their strategies for marketing and government relations accordingly. 
Aiming for the best of both strategies, many investors followed a foothold strategy that
provides an entry to the market, but delays commitment of substantive capital investment. Such
‘platform investment’ (Kogut 1983), e.g. a representative office, permits th  investor to learn about
the local environment while investigating business opportunities. The local base permits a rapid
response to emerging business opportunities. Such foothold strategies were important for the first
investors in Hungary (Marton 1993) and in the volatile environment of Russia (Fey 1995).  
Some authors have developed more detailed typologies of strategies that they observed
in Eastern Europe (Hooley t al. 1993, McCarthy and Puffer 1997, Bridgewater et al. 1995). By
distinguishing entrants by their strategic investment motives and the speed of resource commitment,
they observe some noteworthy strategies: 
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Many investors are client-followers in that they enter Eastern Europe to serve customers
they have served before (Bridgewater et l. 1995). Their investment decisions are thus linked to
the strategies of major customers. This applies in particular in the automotive industry (v.Tulder
and Ruigrok 1998, Meyer 2000b) and in the financial sector, but also ordinary products such as
cola can draw bottling companies and manufacturers of modern packaging to the East. The client
provides a sufficiently large and secure demand to merit the commitment, and from that base the
follower may expand onto the local market. Last not least, many Western businesses such as
accountants and consultants supply projects funded by Western agencies such as the EU (Gilbert
1998).
Investors in the oil and gas industry face heavy up-front investment, especially for
extraction and refining (McCarthy and Puffer 1997). The sector attracts a major share of FDI in
Russia and her neighbours to the South, but investors ha  to be cautious not only because of high
sunk costs, but because they need to cooperate closely with key local players in governments and
among state-owned or privatized monopolies. Investment consortia between major multinational
are thus common, both to share the risk of mega investment projects, and to negotiate with the
authorities.
3.2.3. Marketing Strategies
Beyond entry mode choice, marketing scholars have addressed issues of market penetration,
consumer behaviour and marketing management (see Schuh and pringer 1997 for a review). A
major concern are the trade-off between standardization and differentiation. Batra (1997), and
Arnold and Quelch (1998) recommend a multi-tier product strategy to serve not only the high-end
segments but also the middle and lower price segments of the markets. They suggest that foreign
companies should adjust their product mix to the purchasing power given the low average
household income in these countries. Adaptation of consumer electronics, for example, may strip-
out of existng sophisticated products those features - with the corresponding costs - that are not
highly valued yet, and provide products that are more relible and need less servicing (Batra 1997).
However, empirical research suggests that foreign investors typically position their
products at the upper end of the market, leaving the lower end to local brands, in anticipation of
market growth with the emergence of the middle class (Schuh 2000). Many of the first entrants
were global-oriented companies that create products pro-actively and adapt them passively,
pursuing highly standardized marketing strategies in CEE with limited adaptation e.g. of labelling,
package design and brands (e.g. Church 1992, Hooley et al. 1993). Classic country-related
differentiation can only be found in the consumer goods industry and is often connected to the
acquisition of local companies (Dahm, 1995). In fact, several incidences have reported that
investors discontinued an acquired local brand, but later re-introduced after realizing the loss of the
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mass market (Meyer and Estrin 1998, Lieb-Dóczy 2000). Regional management centres play an
important role in bridging to gap between globalization and local market responsiveness by
selecting the products for in the region, and coordinating marketing strategies for several countries
(Schuh, et al. 1995). 
Research into marketing mix and distribution channels points to major challenges for
multinational entrants. Distribution channels are often fragmented, with small retailers accounting
for a large share of consumer markts. Reliable marketing information is scarce. Channels of mass
communication are less developed and less effective where consumers prefer to rely on personal
experiences. This suggests a need for high distribution intensity and multiple marketing partners
rather than exclusive distributors. Extensions of successful brands (“Umbrella branding") and
multi-tier product strategies to cover high- and middle-price segments of market have proven to
be successful. However, consumers are very price sensitive such that markets tend to be price
competitive. TV and event sponsorship are reported to be most effective to establish brand names
if used considerate to local cultural, political and religious sensitivities (e.g. Shama 1992, Batra
1997, Arnold and Quelch 1998).
Consumer behaviour has been volatile and varying across the region, making it hard to
give definitive answers on issues such as buying behaviour, attitudes to country of origin and
impact of advertising. Most marketing researchers essentially benchmark CEE against the West
thus failing to address issues of specific relevance to countries in transition (Schuh and Springer
1997). Future research may thus pay more attention to issues such as national marketing systems,
specifics of marketing in CEE by country and industry, marketing at different stages of enterprise
transformation, and establishment of effective marketing institutions and networks in CEE.
Reviewing the marketing literature, one notices a variety of innovative strategies
proposed. Yet few authors provide convincing evidence of superior performance of the strategies.
Counter-intuitive evidence, such as first-mover failures, suggest caution. Future research may focus
more on the long-term performance implications.
4. Management Challenges
Western businesses operating within transition eco omies face a number of specific challenges that
arise from the transition context. In this section, we look in particular at the implications of running
a formerly state-owned firm, knowledge transfer, managerial training, and cultural diversity within
the organization.
4.1. Privatisation Acquisition
Owning and managing a privatized business unit confronts businesses with national politics.  From
the investor’s perspective, it is a case of ‘mergers and acquisitions’, yet buying a firm from the
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government results in a number of peculiarities. Privatization aims to break the link between
governments and firms. Yet, the political social and economic context of privatisation constrains
post-privatisation strategies (Uhlenbruck and DeCastro 2000):
C Government sell firms not only to maximise their financial revenues, but to pursue
broader social objectives (e.g. Estrin 1994). The corporate strategy pursued by the
(formerly) state-owned firm is interdependent with other aspects of public policy. For
instance, the divestment of social assets (kindergartens, health care facilities, etc) is
interdependent with the ability of other providers, municipal or otherw se, to provide these
services. Layoffs are constrained by the social consequences of unemployment.
C The negotiation process is complicated not only by the broader set of objectives of the
seller but by the multipliciy of interest groups involved in the process and by the relative
inexperience by the local negotiators (Antal-Mokos 1998). Brouthers and Bamossy (1997)
and Arens and Brouthers (1999) analyse the role of the government using the concept of
the ‘key stakeholder’.
C After completing the sale, governments often continue to be indirectly involved with the
privatised firm. They can create tools to c ntrol the actions of the acquirer as an agent by
extending the contract beyond outright sales. This occurs in CEE through retained
minority shareholding, conditions imposed on the acquirer (Stark 1992, Uhlenbruck and
DeCastro 1998), and competition policy. At the same time, governments may support
privatised firms by securing financing, guarantee procurement, tax breaks, restrictions on
import competition etc. (EBRD 1994, 1999).
Especially ‘staggered divestment’ (Perotti and Guney 1993) allows privatization agencies 
temporary and limited degree of influence on post-acquisition management. If the acquirer attains
management control, the influence of the government on operational management is limited. The
foreign investor may not like the possible government interference in strategic decisions, but would
appreciate the risk sharing and the lower amount of capital to be raised at the outset. Furthermore,
the interests of the government, especially region  or local authorities, are becoming more aligned
with those of the business if they share the profits of the venture. This should reduce undue
bureaucracy and regulatory interference, while providing access to important local networks. 
One might expect weaker performance of firms in mixed ownership because the
government may aim at obtaining social rather than financial returns. At the same time, the private
partner faces weaker incentives arising from the lower share in profits, and may benefit from some
form of transfer pricing. (The MNE has to share any profit of the JV, but keeps all if it is accounted
for elsewhere). Compared to local firms, economic studies do not show better performance for JV
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than for local firms, as would be expected given their more proactive restructuring (Section 2.3).
Managers themselves assess performance of firms with residual government ownership more
negatively (e.g. Lyles and Baird 1994). However, Uhlenbruck and DeCastro (2000) find that firms
with residual state-ownership actually perform better in terms of sales growth.
 With the acquisition the investor takes responsibility for the enterprise transformation
process. This requires substantial additional investment in upgrading of equipment, organizational
restructuring and training. Foreign acquirers thus face an uphill struggle, although compared t
local firms, they have a number of advantages:
C They have access to complementary resources, in particular finance and managerial
knowledge.
C They can establish clear control structures, and thus avoids most of the corporate
governance problems associated with other forms of privatisation in CEE.
C They can better initiate organisational change through the experience in leading
competitive businesses and thus providing and vision and a strategy for the restructuring
C They can create market access by integrating th acquired business into their international
production networks (Schwartz and Zysman 1998, Meyer 2000a).
The importance of investing in the acquired business is illuminated not only by the frequency of
brownfield investment in the region (Meyer and Estrin 1999), but by the fact that investment is the
only strategic variable that Uhlenbruck and DeCastro (2000) and others found clearly associated
with better performance. Also research on joint-ventures suggests that support from the foreign
partner is crucial (Lyles and Baird 1994, Lyles et al. 1996, Fey 1995).
Investors find it difficult to create both ‘strategic fit’ as market-oriented operations are
created from pure manufacturing firms, and ‘organizational fit’ as organisational cultures differ due
to different historical experiences (Uhlenbruck and DeCastro 2000). The investor thus has to create
a comprehensive strategy for the post-acquisition restructuring and integration (Obloj and Thomas
1998, Meyer and Møller 1998, Thomson and McNamara 1998). A central part of this strategy is
the learning process of the local organisation.
4.2. Managing the Learning and Education Process
Firms have to upgrade their managerial capabilities far more fundamentally than is catered for by
conventional management training. Technological skills were on a high level due to good general
education in natural sciences, especially mathematics and engineering. Yet managerial and social
skills were deficient due to both the change of skills and capabilities required in the new
institutional setting, and the separation from modern social sciences. Incumbent leaders were often
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insufficiently prepared as they had different tasks and developed other skills in the central plan
system. In fact the required capabilities are often beyond the experience-horizon of individuals used
to the central-plan system. What is worse, the new private sector in Russia makes very little
provision for training of their employees, while locally available training is limited and relatively
expensive (Clarke and Metalina 2000). The required new skills are often based on tacit know-how,
which requires an interactive learning process (Swaan 1997). They can be described in three levels
(Child 1993, Villinger 1996):
C At the technical level, new and specific techniques have to be acquired such as methods
for quality measurement, scientific and engineering techniques or the construction of
samples for market research.
C At the systemic level, new systems and procedures have to be adopted, which requires
integrative learning emphasising co-ordination, relationships and links. Examples include
co-ordination of integrated production systems, or production control and budgeting
systems. Already at this level, the learner not only has to unlearn acq ired outines and
replace them by new ones, but to reassess attitudes and value systems underlying
behaviour within the organisation under the old and the new regimes (Michailova 1997,
Meyer and Møller 1998). 
C At the strategic level, senior managers have to change their cognitive framework for
doing business and conducting the tasks of management. They need to reassess their
criteria of business success and factors contributing to that success. This requires
understanding of technological and managerial processes in such depth that they can
engage in innovation, select and adapt technology and take strategic decisions.
The acquisition and adaptation of his complex, and in many cases tacit, knowledge is inhibited by
the cultural and institutional context of its transfer (Jankowicz 1994, Kostera and Wicha 1996,
Geppert 1996). Managerial learning, and in particular the internalisation of new knowledge, is
modified by the connection made by recipients between new ideas, information and experiences and
their prior knowledge and experiences. The content of received knowledge is filtered through the
mind set of the recipient in CEE and their experiences in the socialist society (Soulsby and Clark
1996). 
Most academic observers therefore stress the need to contextualize the contents and
methods of training in Eastern Europe (e.g. Jankowicz 1994, 1996, Child and Czekledy 1996). Yet,
a fundamental discrepancy separates Western training methods, which are grounded in extensive
research, and the expectations of Eastern course participants. The contextualisation of training
programs thus faces the dilemma that formalisation of delivery methods, as preferred by many
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participants, cannot achieve the objectives of the training, i.e. inducing managers to think for
themselves on a strategic level (Hollinshead and Michailova 1999).
Those transferring management knowledge to the East often took, especially in the early
1990's, an ethnocentric perspective, believing in the superiority of the Western way of doing things
and being disrespectful, or unaware, of local traditins, cultures and accomplishments (Hollinshead
and Michailova 1999). Western consultants in particular are resented, delivering reports of little
practical use because they fail to understand the institutional contex  of the CEE firms (Soulsby and
Clark 1996). This led to considerable ‘consultancy fatigue’ (Gilbert 1998) especially if the
consultants obtain only superficial information on the ground and, as they are paid for by
international institutions, are more concerned about Brussels or Washington than with Novgorod
or Vladivostok.
This literature advises to employ individuals that relate modern management and post-
communist reality. For instance, Soulsby and Clark (1996) report that local consultants with
Western training and émigrés returning to their roots have been highly appreciated by local
managers. In Central Europe, the intellectual and cultural gap between Western and local managers
is narrowing, yet finding persons capable of communicating effectively in the former Soviet Union
is still a considerable challenge. 
Vlachoutsicos and Lawrence (1996) argue that positive change n managerial practice will
come about only if continuities with the values and decision-making processes of the Russian
traditional collective are preserved, and the natural behaviour of Russian managers are integrated
into newly-introduced managerial systems and practices. From the perspective of evolutionary and
institutional economics, new practices have to be build on existing attitudes and value systems,
preserving selectively what is worthy, and using experimentation to discover new best practices
suitable for transition economies (Kogut 1996, Spicer et al. 2000). JV research confirms the
importance of incorporating local management as ‘shared management’ is generally associated with
better performance (Lyles and Baird 1994, Fey 1995).
The evolutionary development of capabilities is however challenged by the radical nature
of the organisational change faced by many firms. The turbulence, the dramatic shortfall of available
resources, and the fundamental threats created for many people has inhibited, if not undermined,
their willingness to learn (Hedberg 1991, Villinger 1996). In the face of high uncertainty imitation
of imposed practices may be preferred to an internalisation of new knowledge (Child and Czegledy
1996). Newman andNollen (1998) thus observe an inverse-U shaped relationship between firms’
ability to learn and to restructure and the gap between existing and required capabilities. This
suggests that training should be based on a step-wise learning process, with clearly delimitated
intermediate targets. 
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4.3. Managing Cultural Diversity
Western investors managing acquired businesses or joint-ventures in transition economies
experience considerable cultural diversity, and consequently conflicts between different groups
within the organization (e.g. Child and Markoczy 1993, Puffer and McCarthy 1997). Managing
such conflicts of organisational culture is a major challenge for joint-ventures, especially in Russia
(Puffer et al. 1996, Michailova 2000, Fey and Beamish 1999). As Russian culture is often seen as
not conducive to successful market-based management, managers, as well as re earchers, face a
major challenge in howto change organizational culture (Fey and Denison 1999). Yet what are the
origins of such cross-cultural conflicts?
The cultural legacy of socialism
The business culture in transition economies is in flux, and therefore hard to define. Three distinct
cultural forces are, in a way, battling for the hearts and minds of East European people. These are
firstly the historical cultural roots that have been loosened, but not lost with the arrival of socialism.
Secondly, the socialist experience b ars upon those who grew up under the system. Thirdly, many
people are willing to shed either legacy to adapt Western culture, or what is received of it through
the media, business contacts and tourists. Thus, culture is unusually unstable and shows
considerable discrepancies between the cultural norms and behaviours communicated in public and
those people actually internalized (Todeva 1999).  Feichtinger and Fink (1998) describe the
volatility of culture in the 1990's, and the corresponding confusion at the individual level, as
‘collective culture shock’. This analogy suggests that after a period of disorientation, the societies
will recover and prosper with the new cultural identity. In the Western parts of the region, culture
is converging to West European patterns, wi h regional specialties such egalitarian and religious
values.
Socialism left behind a ‘bloc culture’ (Sztompka 1993). This is not the officially
propagated philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, but the reality of values and attitudes of individuals
within real existing socialism. Despite the communitarian ideology, socialist regimes were low-trust
regimes. Distrust was institutionalised through networks of informers of KGB or its partner
institutions, fostering suspicion even when it was without foundation. In consequence people drew
a sharp separation between their private and public circles. As a double legacy of socialism,
“individuals are likely to have a high degree of trust in their immediate social network, and a high
degree of distrust in the formal institutions of the state” (Rose et al. 1997:10). Low levels of trust
in institutions continue in the transition period, reinfo ced by insider privatization that benefited the
old nomenklatura, the growth of the Mafia, and corrupt politicians. Transition thus has to build
trust in institutions, beyond the personal level.
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Russian business culture has however roots that go deeper than socialism. Several
researchers aim at explaining this culture and the merging cross-cultural discrepancies in Russian-
Western organisations (Lawrence and Vlachoutsicos 1990, Puffer et al. 1996, Michailova 2000,
Holden and Cooper 1994, Holden et al. 1998, Kets de Vries 1998, Elenkov 1998). Vlachoutsicos
(1998) presents a comprehensive analysis of ’the inner logic of Russian management’ based on its
roots in both Russian history and the influences of 70 years of socialism. He outlines the
’matrioshka’ structure of Russian organisations with strong vertical ties, but weak horizontal co-
ordination, and the traditional decision making process. This is typically top-down on strategic
matters, but contains a major consultative element on issues of implementation, if only in 
ritualised fashion. 
These traditions influence perceptions of Russian managers’ by their Western
counterparts. For instance, Russians are reported to act short-term orientated, averse against
planning, and they typically expect the leaders to take strategic decisions, but discuss methods of
implementation (Michailova 2000). Yet there is considerable variation of behaviour and belief
systems between, say, a Soviet-area senior executive and a young entrepreneur (e.g. Puffer t al.
1997).
Networking
Bonding and other forms of network activities have a central role in Russian business. They arise
from both cultural traditions and as substitute to legal institutions such as contract enforcement.
East European managers are well versed in developing personal business networks, and in making
informal arrangements to compensate for the breakdowns in formal resource allocation and
distribution systems (Child and Czegledy 1996, Martin 1999). At least the former is, while
commonly overlooked in economic models, is an important part of business in any economic
system, and fostered in modern management under the title of the ‘network organization’. 
In Russia, networking occurs more at a personal level activity rather than between
institutions. Several studies emphasise the importance of personal relationships s Russians typically
do not distinguish between personal friends and business relations (Kets d  Vries 1998, Salmi 1999,
Meyer et al. 1999). Social activities thus are part of business dealings. This arises from co-
operative value systems, distrust towards strangers, and traditions such as blat (Ledeneva 1999).
To overcome initial mistrust, Russians are reported not to engage in business before they have
shared social activities, and substantial amounts of vodka. Western partners are expected to
participate in such bonding activity (Holden et a . 1998).
The reliance on informal relationships raise  pertinent issues of business ethics for local
and in particular foreign business persons operating in the region. The emphasis on connections
may undermine the introduction of new and objective standards of performance by creating distrust
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and dissatisfaction (Cyr and Schneider 1996). Moreover, there is a thin line between networking
and unethical or illegal activity. Russians consider for example violation of insensible laws as
normal, yet can it be for a Western investor? It may be infeasible to do business if one was to obey
all the rules at all times (Puffer and McCarthy 1995). Experienced investors say that there are ways
to cope with the situation, e.g. by building contacts at highest level in the authorities, by knowing
the law precisely, and by exchanging experiences with other Western expatriates. Yet, Russia is not
for beginners.
Communication
A challenge that is often underestimated by Western expatriates is the communication across
cultural and linguistic divides (Villinger 1996, Cyr and Schneider 1996, Jankowica 1994). Effective
communication is important to convey to the entire workforce the strategic direction of the
business, to obtain direct feedback, and to build personal relationships  and trust. It requires that
both partners are sensitive to each others cultural and historical context and share a commo
language (Villinger 1996, Michailova and Anisimova 1999, Michailova 2000). Learning on local
business conditions is particularly important in transition economies because of their distinct
history, traditions and economic structures which feed contemporary culture.
Many Western MNE operating in CEE invest in training their Eastern workforce in the
company language, typically English or German, yet few expatriates learn local languages (Villinger
1996, Michailova 2000). This is seen with some resentment by local employees, and can create
considerable misunderstandings as translators are naturally imprecise notably for business
terminology where English terms do not have precise equivalents in Slovonic languages
(Hollinshead and Michailova 1999). In addition, the communication has to overcome the culturally-
conditioned differences in key concepts such as ’time’, ’plan’ and ’control’ (Michailova 2000),
which is a particular serious problem in Slavonic languages where expressions for certain Western
business terminology have not been developed prior to 1990.
Human resource management
Human resource management has to accommodate the cultural diversity. An area where this
appears particular difficult is the recruitment and remuneration of people for the local operation.
Many investors assign expatriates to all top management positions, and aim at recruiting and
training local personnel to take over these positions after a few years. This however proved
difficult, especially for finance and marketing personnel. The small number of qualified people in
these fields, often younger than their Western counterparts, found themselves head-hunted by
Western investors. Yet, beyond this small elite, managerial labour markets hardly function at all
because of the shortage of key personnel (Peiperl and Estrin 1997).
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Local firms have generally low turnaround of managers. Three years into transition, 78%
of top and second tier management positions in the Czech Republic were still held by former
nomenklatura managers. Most changes occurred at the position of the CEO and the personnel
managers, often the party representative, who were mostly replaced internally (Clark and Soulsby
1996, Newman and Nollen 1998). Management change is more frequent in firms facing competition
and hard budget constraints (EBRD 1999:139) and, where outsiders were recruited, associated
with better performance (Claessens and Djankov 1998), suggesting that active recruitment will
eventually take hold in the region. 
Western HRM approaches have been adopted in the region, for instance by creating a
wider spread of salaries (Basu et al. 1997, Clark and Soulsby 1996). Incentive-based pay has been
introduced, especially by Western inv stors, but with mixed success as it sometimes conflicts with
the egalitarian local culture (Mueller and Clarke 1998, Cyr and Schneider 1996). As in other areas
of management, HRM practice in Central Europe converges towards West European models, while
Russians till have a high level of suspicion over the introduction of Western management ideas
(Holden et al. 1998, Shekshina 1998). MNEs adopted their HRM policies to the local context to
varying degrees. While performance appraisal and promotion were standardized, recruitment,
training and financial reward systems were locally adapted, especially in Russia (Björkman and
Ehrnrooth 1999). Only some of the HRM policies  adapted in Russian firms were found to actually
improve performance (Fey et al. 2000).
5. Perspectives for future Research
The study of business in transition economies offers opportunities not only to understand
‘transition’ but to generate insights, concepts and th oretical frameworks for international business
in general. The transition economies provide a laboratory for usiness; and insights gained here will
contribute to the discourse on global economy in the 21 century. Research challenges includest
questions on how business evolve during radical org niz tional change, and how institutions shape
corporate behaviour. Scholars may venture more inductive research, and dev lop new concepts and
frameworks relevant beyond the region.
In the 1990s, research focussed on issues that were specific to the start of transition and
the opening to international business. Research needs to move on, from privatization to new
entrepren urial businesses, from entry strategies to operations strategies, and from negotiating
acquisitions to managing subsidiaries. Yet this research need  to o sider the business context that,
as proposed in Section 2.1, has developed specific institutional characteristics that are likely to
persist for the next decades.
The analysis of institutions and their influence on corporate strategies and enterprise
behaviour can be taken beyond Peng (2000) to explain not only the differences of strategies
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between capitalist and transition economies, but to explain variations within regions. China
followed a different path of transition, with gradual reform since the late 1970s, but observers
detected interesting similarities with transition in Europe at the level of enterprises (Child and
Markoczy 1993, Batra 1997, Peng 2000). Yet researchers need to be cautios about generalizing
across emerging economies - as evident from comparing this paper from its companion on China
(Child 2001). Challenges faced by enterprises vary considerably due to different macroeconomic
and institutional contexts even within the region. Hungary and poland, for example, converge with
Western Europe, while Russia will retain distinct features for many years.
For example, the legal-institutional framework cannot yet guarantee property rights, which
creates interesting challenges for contracting under uncertainty and without external enforcement
mechanisms. Corporate ownership and governance exhibits specific features such as a high share
of employee-ownership, staggered privatization, and close relations between businesses and
governments. This implies that managers have to pursue profits a  well as non-monetary objectives
set by the firm’s shareholders and stakeholders. 
Firms design their corporate strategies and management procedures in response to these
institutions, in particular by building business relationships that rely not only on markets as
coordination mechanism. Consequently, we observe innovatory strategies such as conglomerate
building in form of ‘recombinant property’ (Stark 1996) and ‘network-base growth strategies’
(Peng and Heath 1996). Further research may explore in more depth how different institutions
influence the design of business organisations. This requires the development of more sophisticated
analytical tools concerning the link between institutions and strategy.
Foreign investors too select and adjust their modes of business. They develop new forms
of non-equity cooperation, engage in ‘transitory alliances’ (Hagedorn and Sadowski 1999) and
‘brownfield investment’ (Meyer and Estrin 1999). Businesses moreover face major challenges in
understanding the local business cultures and in developing appropriate approaches to cross-
cultural management and o change management - areas where applied research could be of great
value. Last not least, technological advances may permit the region to leap-frog stages of
technological development and innovate business, e.g. in e-commerce. 
The analysis of business in an unusual context provides a laboratory to explore aspects
that are less observable in mature mark t economies. Novel concepts and analytical frameworks
may feed back into theories used in mainstream international business research. In addition to the
institutional perspective, Hoskisson et al. (2000) point to the potential of adapting transaction cost
theory and the resource-based view of the firm to the specific challenges of emerging markets.
However to enrich these frameworks, researchers have to be venturous in their approaches, and
apply exploratory research methods. Existing theory helps analysis by concentrating attention on
important variables and relationships - but fails if important variables or relationships are missed.
32
Few region specific insights are born out of hypothesis testing of standard theory. We nee
inductive research to understand new or unconventional business contexts. Longitudinal studies
and linkages to related literature in, for example, transition economics and sociology may help to
develop new, relevant and dynamic theoretical frameworks.
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1. Readers interested in comprehensive reviews of economic transition are recommended to
consult Lavigne (1999) as well as reviews comission by multilateral institutions (e.g. World
Bank 1996, Fisher and Sahay 2000, EBRD annually). Independentstudi s are published e.g.
in the Journal of Comparative Economics, Economics of Transition, and Comparative
Economic Studies. This author maintains a website with information on recent research and
links: http://www.econ.cbs.dk/institutes/cees/
2. Concise surveys of recent trends of FDI are provided by EBRD (annually), and UN
(annually). For a critical evaluation of the data see Brewer (1994), Meyer (1995) and Meyer
and Pind (1999).
3. The empirical evidence on performance implications is hotly debated as many Western
advisors ee it as a key obstacle to restructuring (e.g. Havrylyshyn and Gettigan 1999).
Several studies suggest that manager-ownership outperforms employee ownership (e.g.
Frydman et al. 1997). Yet other studies find positive effects of employee ownership
compared to dispersed shareholding or state-ownership on production efficiency (Smith et
al. 1997, Jones and Mygind 1999b), on labour productivity (Earle and Estrin 1997,
Djankov 1999b), and on product, input and asset restructuring (Estrin and Rosevear 1999).
4. On the nature of firms in the real existing socialism ee for instance Berliner (1952), Kornai
(1980, 1992) and Lawrence and Vlachoutsicos 1990).
5. A starting point may be the series of short research notes on transition economies in the
Journal of Small Business Management in 1995 to 1997.
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